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struct the jury to bring in a verdict for the defendant. By stating that
you cannot build an inference on an inference the court has a ready
formula to reach the same result.
But if the court thinks the evidence is strong enough it will fre-
quently say that on the whole case the evidence is sufficient to make out
a prima facie case and should go to the jury. In the principal case the
supreme court so held, and the result seems justified, although it might
plausibly be argued that this involved the building of an inference on
an inference. In the Lubric Oil case, supra, the evidence was obviously
not so strong.
The maxim that you cannot build an inference on an inference
furnishes a test, the application of which may appear to be more definite
or certain than the broad and often difficult issue of whether there is
enough evidence to go to the jury. But it is submitted that this apparent
definiteness or certainty in the maxim is illusory.
HOBERT H. BUSH
WAIVER OF PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE UNDER SECTION
11494 OF THE OHIO GENERAL CODE
Plaintiff sued for damages for personal injuries. At the trial, on
direct examination, he testified that his general physical condition had
been good previous to the accident in which the injuries were allegedly
sustained. It was held that this voluntary testimony did not constitute
a waiver of the physician-patient privilege given in Ohio Gen. Code,
sec. I 1494. Consequently, a physician who had been called to contro-
vert the fact put in issue by plaintiff concerning plaintiff's physical con-
dition before the accident was not permitted to testify. It was also held
that testimony given by plaintiff on cross-examination in response to
questions was not voluntary within the meaning of the statute and so did
not constitute a waiver although the doctor and the treatment received
had been mentioned. Harpman v. Devine, 133 Ohio St. 1 (1937).
To effect a satisfactory disposition of cases according to their merit
it may be assumed that all relevant evidence should be admissible. In
addition, if this were the only objective or consideration, all persons
should be under a duty to disclose all relevant facts. However, when
the benefits derived by society through enforcing this duty and permit-
ting testimony concerning all relevant facts are outweighed by the
harmful effects such testimony may have, then the evidence may be
excluded.
The old common law excluded much evidence, otherwise relevant,
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on such grounds as incompetency or privilege of witnesses, prejudice of
the defendant, confusion of the jury, or untrustworthiness of the testi-
mony. In the last fifty years it has been increasingly apparent that the
harm caused by the admission of this testimony is not as real as was
originally supposed. Consequently there has been a growing tendency
to construe these exclusionary rules strictly and thus to let in more and
more relevant evidence.
One of these exclusionary rules, that of privileges, was designed to
foster freedom of disclosure in certain relationships such as lawyer and
client. The common law has always recognized a privilege in the law-
yer-client relationship. Skilled men are necessary in lawsuits and must
be fully informed if they are to adequately represent their clients. A
client might not talk freely to his lawyer if he thought the latter could
be compelled to disclose in a court of law those facts that had been com-
municated to him. With this in mind the apprehension of the client is
removed by the lawyer-client privilege.
Although this same reasoning is advanced in favor of the physician-
patient privilege yet the influencing factors are not so apparent. It is
somewhat difficult to imagine an individual in a diseased or injured con-
dition and at the same time refraining from seeking medical attention
for fear of later disclosure in a court of law of the information he would
have to divulge to his physician. Consultation with a physician is far
far removed, in most cases, from a court of law. On the other hand,
it is equally difficult to perceive a situation where an individual in con-
sultation with an attorney is not, in some degree, thinking in terms of a
court room and hence conscious, at that time, of what might there be
revealed. Accordingly, in that aspect at least, the benefit to society
gained by the exclusion of the physician's testimony is less apparent
than the benefit derived by excluding the testimony of the lawyer.
The common law recognized no doctor-patient privilege. Myers v.
State, 192 Ind. 492, 137 N.E. 547, 24 A.L.R. 1196 (1922); People
v. .4ustin, 199 N.Y. 446, 93 N.E. 57 (1910) In the absence of stat-
ute there is no such privilege today. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Crockett's
Admx. 232 Ky. 726, 24 S.W. (2d) 580 (I93O); Remington v.
R. I. Co., 37 R. I. 393, 93 Atl. 33 (915); Rex v. Gibbons, i C.
& P- 97, 171 Eng. Rep. 1117 (1923). This privilege is given by
statute in Ohio today, as well as in a majority of other jurisdictions. 28
R.C.L. 532, Section 11494 of the Ohio Gen. Code provides: "The
following persons shall not testify in certain respects-an attorney, con-
cerning a communication made to him by his client in that relation, or
his advice to his client; or a physician concerning a communication made
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to him by his patient in that relation, or his advice to his patient. But the
attorney or the physician may testify by express consent of the client
or patient; and if the client or patient voluntarily testifies, the attorney
or physician may be compelled to testify on the same subject."
In the instant case the plaintiff testified voluntarily and declared that
his health had been good previous to the accident in which the injuries
were allegedly sustained. Did he by this testimony waive his privilege?
The statute says that if the patient voluntarily testifies the doctor may be
compelled to testify on the same subject. Is the subject the health of the
plaintiff or is it the communications between the doctor and patient?
In the two cases of King v. Barrett, i i Ohio St. 261 (1 860) and
Spitzer v. Stillings, io9 Ohio St. 297, 142 N.E. 365 (1924) the court,
dealing with the lawyer-client privilege under the statute in question held
that voluntary general testimony by the client in the case was sufficient
to constitute a waiver of the privilege. As a result the attorney was
allowed to be examined touching such admissions as were pertinent to
the issue. And this was held to be the result even though the client had
made no reference to any communications that had passed between him
and the lawyer.
The majority opinion in the principal case dismisses the mention of
these two cases with the statement that they "are distinguishable from the
case at bar." The only apparent distinction seems to be that they deal
with the privilege of lawyer-client while the instant case involves the
privilege of physician-patient. In view of the fact that the former privi-
lege existed before the statute and because there is obviously more justi-
fication for it than for the latter, a distinction might be drawn construing
the privilege of doctor-patient more narrowly. But surely there is no
reason for construing it more broadly.
With the construction of the statutory lawyer-client privilege given
in King v. Barrett, supra, before it in 1878, the Ohio General Assembly
re-enacted the statute in substantially the same terms and at that time
the physician-patient privilege was included. An often quoted rule of
statutory construction would favor the supposition that the legislature
meant to adopt this interpretation. 59 C. J. io63. Many cases sup-
port this view although only a few are here listed. Ledingham v. City
of Blaine, 1O5 Wash. 253, 177 Pac. 783 (1919); Bell v. Bell, 287
Pa. 269, 135 Ad. 219 (1926); Peo. v. Twp. of Munising, 213 Mich.
629, 182 N.W. 118 (1921); Kendall v. Garneau, 55 Neb. 403, 75
N.W. 852 (1898); Spitzer v. Stillings, supra.
The privilege when granted should be a shield and not a sword.
A patient may not want his bodily condition known to the world. But
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here the plaintiff is willing to disclose it. He calls a doctor to testify
concerning his injuries and that the injuries were caused by the accident.
However, he objects to the defendant calling a doctor to show that
plaintiff's physical condition previous to the accident was not good.
It is indeed harsh to permit other people to show that his health was good
and to allow the plaintiff to testify to such fact himself and then on the
basis of the privilege to prevent the defendant from showing that it
was not.
The conclusion is submitted that the statute was susceptible of two
constructions. But arguments of Orecedent and policy both favored
admissibility. King v. Barrett, supra, and Spitzer v. Stillngs, supra,
although dealing with the lawyer-client relationship, seemed to cover
the same point and in both cases it was held that the privilege had been
waived. On questions of policy the argument seems equally strong. The
decision would seem to represent a step backward from Ohio's previous
advanced position in regard to the construction of privileges.
PHILIP J. WOLF
FUTURE INTERESTS
RECOGNITION OF DETERMINABLE FEE WHERE THERE Is No
EXPRESS RESERVATION OF POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER
Appellant Board of Education filed an action to quiet title to a lot
which had been conveyed to its predecessor by a deed containing the
following recitals: '!said lands to be occupied for the purposes of a
school house and for no other use or purposes whatsoever," and, in the
habendum clause, "to have and to hold . . . so long as the same shall
be used as a site for a school house and no longer." Use of the lot for
school purposes had been discontinued by appellant four years before the
filing of this action. Appellee denied title of appellant and alleged that
he had acquired title from the heirs of one of the original grantors.
Appellant claimed that the deed gave its predecessor an unrestricted fee.
Appellee contended that appellant had only the right to occupy the lot as
long as it was used for school purposes, and that appellant had forfeited
its interest in discontinuing such use. Held, that the language used
clearly expressed an intention on the part of the original grantor to pro-
vide for a reverter and forfeiture and conveyed a tenure limited to the
continued ,use for school purposes, Board of Education v. Hollinesworth
et al., 56 Ohio App. 95 (1936).
The general rule in the construction of deeds, that the intention is
controlling, obtains in the construction of conditions; the language of a
